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    Using micro-level data on attorney incomes in 2004, we reconstruct the 
industrial organization of the Japanese legal services industry.  These data suggest a 
somewhat bifurcated bar, with two sources of unusually high income: talent in Tokyo, 
and scarcity elsewhere.  The most talented would-be lawyers (those with the highest 
opportunity costs) pass the bar-exam equivalent on one of their first tries or abandon the 
effort.  If they pass, they  tend to opt for careers in Tokyo that involve complex litigation 
and  business transactions.  This work places a premium on their talent, and from it they 
earn appropriately high incomes.  The less talented face lower opportunity costs, and 
willingly spend many years studying for the exam.  If they eventually pass, they 
disproportionately forego the many amenities available to professional families in Tokyo 
and  opt instead for careers in the under-lawyered provinces.  There, they earn  scarcity 
and monopoly rents not available in the far more competitive Tokyo market. 
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 For over five decades now, modern Japan has made do with few attorneys.  As of 
2004, it had about 21,000.  With roughly 40 percent the U.S. population,  and 40 percent 
the GDP, it had but 2 percent as many lawyers.   
 The dearth has not been for want of applicants for the job.  Instead, it has 
followed from deliberate policy.  For over half a century, the government has required all 
would-be lawyers to study at its Legal Research & Training Institute (LRTI).  Only by 
attending the LRTI could one become a lawyer, but only by passing a fiercesomely hard 
entrance exam could one attend it.  From 1968 to 1992, the government kept the pass rate 
on this exam below 3 percent.  Even as recently as 2004, only 2.97 percent passed. 
 With so few lawyers and  so many applicants vying for so few slots, basic logic 
suggests industry incumbents should earn substantial rents.  Curiously, however, they 
seem not to earn stratospheric incomes.  Instead, they earn incomes that track those of 
well-paid white-collar workers more generally.  Why they apparently earn so little thus 
presents one puzzle.  Why so many still try so hard to join the bar presents a second.  And 
why some  lawyers earn more than the mass of their rivals presents a third. 
 To explore these questions, we use data from attorney’s personal tax records.  
Through 2004, the Japanese government disclosed the tax liabilities of everyone who 
paid more than 10 million yen (about $100 thousand) in taxes.  About 400 lawyers met 
this criterion.  We take the tax liabilities of these lawyers, collect information about their 
personal and professional backgrounds, and add analogous information on a random 
sample of another 1,100 lawyers.  Using the resulting dataset, we study the determinants 
of professional success within the Japanese bar.   
 These tax records describe a somewhat bifurcated market.  As the locus for the 
most complex business transactions and litigation, Tokyo generates the highest returns to 
legal talent.  Disproportionately, the brightest lawyers locate there and join the large 
firms that specialize in  problems that exploit their unusual abilities.  Facing high 
opportunity costs to a legal career, they expect, demand, and earn appropriately high pay.   
 The vast majority of attorneys are men and women of a different sort.  Lacking 
the intellectual ability that better-paying corporate employers  demand, they incur fewer 
opportunity costs to try to join the bar, despite their lower odds of passage.  Even after 
repeatedly failing the LRTI exam, they keep trying.  Eventually, a few of them pass.   
 If these less talented people finally do join the bar, disproportionately they forego 
the many amenities available to professional families in Tokyo, and locate in the 
provinces instead.  With half of all Japanese lawyers, Tokyo presents a highly 
competitive market.  By choosing to practice instead in a small provincial city, these less 
able lawyers can earn monopoly and scarcity rents not available in Tokyo.  Hence the 
contrast:  the brighter lawyers tend to choose Tokyo for the premium on ability; the 
slower tend to choose the provinces for the monopoly returns.   
  
I.  The Japanese Legal Services Industry 
A.  The Puzzle: 
 Something is wrong with the following picture.  Subject to a draconian entry 
barriers,  the Japanese bar seems miniscule, yet its members earn only modestly high 
incomes.  If they number so few, why do they not earn stratospheric returns?  If they do 
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not make more than other high-level white-collar workers, why do they try so hard to 
become lawyers?   
 Lawyers are indeed few in Japan.  As of 2004, they numbered 21,174.  Given the 
general population, that gave Japan one  lawyer for every 6,305 people.  By contrast, the 
U.S. had one lawyer for every 286.  The U.K. had one  per 547, Germany had one per 
651, and even France had one for every 1,488 people.1 
 Lawyers are few because most would-be lawyers flunk  what is the equivalent of 
the bar-exam  in Japan.  Law is an undergraduate major in Japan (and now the subject of 
post-graduate "law schools" as well), but those who would practice law must attend  what 
has been the single law school--- LRTI—as well.  The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) together 
with the Supreme Court and bar leaders  controls entry to the Institute, and for most of 
the post-war period flunked most of the people who took the entrance examination.2   
 Lawyers also seem talented.  After all, every one of them passed   an exam that 
97-99 percent of test-takers failed.  The MOJ hires law professors to write and score the 
exams, and these professors grade the exams blind.3  At the very least, the process ought 
to guarantee extraordinarily high cognitive skills. 
 Thus, in Japan lawyers are talented and scarce, and should be earning rents to 
both their talent and the artificial scarcity of lawyers.  Moreover, the scarcity of lawyers 
would seem to make the possibility of collusion easier, especially outside of Tokyo, 
adding monopoly rents  to the talent and scarcity rents.  
 But elite Japanese lawyers seem not to earn anything close to the draws of  
America’s “AmLaw 100” partners.  From time to time, the Japanese bar association 
surveys its members about their income.  In 1990 they reported a median income of 11 
million yen and a mean of 15 million.  Come 2000, they still reported a 15 million 
average---about $146 thousand (on the distribution of income for all occupations in 
Japan, see Sec. B., below).4   
 Attorneys in Japan earn incomes that just barely exceed good white-collar 
incomes.  Corporate branch managers in the 1990s (with a mean age of 50) earned about 
12 million yen, while a lawyer (by the 1990 survey) in his 40s made 14 million yen and 
one in his 50s made 20 million. That’s a bit higher. Compared to physicians, however, 
                     
1 Nihon bengoshi rengo kai, Bengoshi hakusho [Lawyer White Paper] 77, 81 (Tokyo:  Nihon 
bengoshi rengo kai, 2005). 
2 For an insightful analysis, see Tom Ginsburg & Glen Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant:  An 
Empirical Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. Legal Stud. 31, 37-38 (2006).  Japan recently 
increased the number of people it passed -- but that simply led to an increase in the number of people 
taking the exam.  For historical pass rates, see J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Japanese Law:  An 
Economic Approach 7 tab. 1.1 (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1999); 
http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/051007-1/17syutu-gou2.html 
3 For an excellent description of the exam, see Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Economic 
Organizations and Corporate Governance in Japan:  The Impact of Formal and Informal Rules 211 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004). 
4 Milhaupt & West, supra note, at 219; see also Arthur J. Alexander & Hong W. Tan, Barriers to 
U.S. Service Trade in Japan 18 (Santa Monica:  Rand Corp. 1984) (R-3175) (using the high-income 
taxpayer database in the early 1980s). 
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the attorneys badly underperformed.  A doctor running a private clinic earned a mean 32 
million, and even a salaried physician (mean age of 37) made 13 million.5 
 Compared to American lawyers, these represent respectable incomes -- but not 
stratospheric.  According to John Heinz and Edward Laumann’s classic study of Chicago 
lawyers, the median  . attorney in the U.S.A.  made about double the national median for 
all occupations, and the top 12 percent made double that attorney median.6  On the one 
hand, in Japan,  15 million yen does more than double the national median.  On the other 
hand, it falls far below the AmLaw 100.   
 Where U.S. bar examiners pass the majority of those who apply, the Japanese 
examiners pass hardly anyone.  With such a brutal entry barrier, why do incumbents earn 
such modest amounts? 
   
B.  Legal Services Industry: 
 By the late 1980s at least part of the answer to this first puzzle was relatively 
clear.  First, although contemporary Japan and the U.S. have roughly the same  median 
incomes, that income is far more compressed in Japan.7  This compression involves not 
just aggregate income, but executive compensation patterns as well.8  To the extent that 
most college graduates who opt for legal careers could have selected business careers 
instead, the compression in Japanese executive compensation should dampen high-level 
legal incomes too.   
 Second, Japanese lawyers face a large number of unlicensed competitors.9  The 
largest group staffs the legal departments of Japanese corporations.  Some 45,000 
students major in law as undergraduates at the 93 university law departments.10  Upon 
graduation, most take jobs at private firms.  There, many of them draft contracts, manage 
regulatory filings, and negotiate disputes.  At   insurance companies, they handle claims 
                     
5 Bengoshi gyomu no keizaiteki kiban ni kansuru jittai hokoku [Empirical Report on the Economic 
Foundation of Lawyers' Work], 42 Jiyu to seigi 1 (1991).  Discussed in Ramseyer & Nakazato with 
comparative numbers, supra note, at 14. 
6 John P. Heinz & Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers:  The Social Structure of the Bar, rev. 
ed. 8-11 (Evanston:  Russell Sage, 1994), 8-11. 
7 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes:  A Historical and 
International Perspective, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 200 (Papers & Proceedings, 2006).  See also Sec. II.A.1., 
infra. 
8 Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Executive Compensation in Japan:  
Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics & Business Working Paper No. xx, 2006). 
9 J. Mark Ramseyer, Lawyers, Foreign Lawyers, and Lawyer-Substitutes:  The Market for 
Regulation in Japan, 27 Harv. Int'l L.J. 499 (l986); Masanobu Kato, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan 
and the United States, 1987 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 627; Michael K. Young & Constance Hamilton, The Legal 
Profession of Japan, in Mitsuo Matsushita, ed., Japanese Business Law Guide Para. 7-260 though 7-900 
(Sydney:  CCH Australia, Ltd. 1988); Richard S. Miller, Apples v. Persimmons:  The Legal Profession in 
Japan and the United States, 39 J. Legal Educ. 27 (1989). 
10 Shihou seido kaikaku shingikai, Shihou seido kaikaku shingikai Ikensho:  21 seiki no Nihon wo 
sasaeru shiho seido [Position of the Committee on Legal System Reform:  A Legal System to Support the 
21st Century Japan] (June 12, 2001). 
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over traffic and other accidents.  For much of the work that U.S. firms assign to lawyers, 
Japanese firms hire university-trained but unlicensed legal specialists.11   
 Other competitors operate from various licensed sub-sectors.  “Judicial 
scrivenors” (shiho shoshi; as of 2006, 18,000) draft contracts, and handle the paper work 
for regulatory matters and real estate transactions.  “Administrative scriveners” (gyosei 
shoshi; 39,000)   handle government paperwork.  “Tax agents” (zeirishi; 69,000) file 
individual and corporate returns, sell tax planning advice, and negotiate audits.  “Patent 
agents” (benrishi; 6,200) handle filings and disputes over intellectual property.  And 
“notary publics” (koshonin; 540),who have their own monopolized niche, draft wills and 
corporate charters.12   
 Largely because of this competition, most Japanese attorneys specialize in the one 
activity over which courts enforce the unauthorized practice ban:  litigation.13  
Traditionally, they operated out of small offices, and most worked in cities with court 
houses.  As of 2005, nearly 40 percent  still practiced alone, and about an equal number 
practiced in firms of two to five lawyers.14  Only in Tokyo and Osaka did anyone work in 
a firm with more than 20 lawyers.  Exclude metropolitan Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya, and 
Fukuoka, and no one worked in a firm with more than 10.15 
 Traditionally, few lawyers other than those at the Tokyo international firms did 
much besides litigate.  The largest of these international firms (e.g., Nishimura Tokiwa) 
now exceed 200 lawyers, and offer the full panoply of corporate services.  A small group 
of Americans who obtained special licenses during the post-war occupation once 
dominated this international market.  No more.  Those men are gone now (though four 
remained on the rolls in 2004),16 and only a few of the current firms (principally 
Anderson Mori Tomotsune) trace their lineage directly to them.  Instead, most Western 
lawyers in Tokyo work for the large U.S. (e.g., Morrison & Forester) and U.K. law firms 
(e.g., Clifford Chance).  Several of these now include many Japanese lawyers as well.17   
 
II.  Empirical Resources 
A.  The Data: 
 1.  Tax data coverage. -- If a Japanese lawyer makes only  amodestly high 
income, why do so many people try desperately to become one?  Among Japanese 
attorneys, what determines who makes the better money?  To begin to explore these   two 
questions, we estimate   incomes in the year 2004 from the amount of taxes attorneys 
                     
11 For an analysis and description of these departments, see Toshimitsu Kitagawa & Luke Nottage, 
Globalization of Japanese Corporations and the Development of Corporate Legal Departments:  Problems 
and Prospects, Raising the Bar:  The Emerging Legal Profession in East Asia (William P. Alford, ed., 
Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, Forthcoming). 
12 Numbers from web sites. 
13 Bengoshi ho [Attorneys Act], Law No. 205, of 1949, Sec. 72; see Ramseyer, supra note. 
14 Nihon bengoshi, supra note, at 93. 
15 Nihon bengoshi, supra note, at 93. 
16 Nihon bengoshi, supra note, at 70. 
17 For a directory to this corporte legal services market, see Nikkei Business Publications, ed., 
Bijinesu bengoshi taizen 2006 [An Encyclopedia of Business Lawyers, 2006] (Tokyo:  Nikkei BP, 2005). 
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paid.  We obtained this information because of a now-discontinued Japanese government 
policy.  Through the 2004 taxable year, the tax office published the names, addresses, and 
tax liabilities of those taxpayers who reported the highest incomes.  The amount of 
liability that triggered this public disclosure varied over the years, but in 2004 it stood at 
10 million yen (at the end-of-2004 exchange rate of 102.68 yen/$, about $97,000).   
 Starting with the 2005 taxable year, this taxpayer data is no longer available.  
Under the newly passed Personal Information Protection Act, the government may not 
release a variety of private information.18  Because tax liabilities fall within the scope of 
the ban, the government will not release the taxpayer lists.  Our 2004 data thus represent 
the last available set of this information. 
 For all lawyers on this high-income taxpayer (HIT) list, we enter the actual taxes 
they paid in 2004.  For all lawyers not on the list, we know only that they paid less than 
10 million yen.  Because our data are thus “censored below” at 10 million, we use tobit 
regressions.   
 In 2004, some 73,000 Japanese paid 10 million yen or more in taxes.  As 
discussed earlier, compared to the U.S. this is few.  Japan has about half the population of 
the U.S., and roughly the same median household income.  Yet in 2003, U.S. taxpayers 
filed 536,000 returns with adjusted gross incomes of over $500,000, an income which 
conservatively would pay 10 million yen in taxes. U.S. taxpayers filed nearly 181,000 
returns with over $1,000,000 (www.irs.gov). 
 We obtained our tax data from the Japanese affiliate of D&B, Tokyo shoko 
risaachi (TSR).19  Naturally, TSR uses the data for credit investigations.  In some cases, it 
has added the professional affiliation of the taxpayers.  Where it did, we generally 
followed that identification.  We obtain our information on attorney backgrounds from 
the 2005 directory of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA).20   
 To maximize the number of observations with tax data, we use stratified 
sampling--- sampling different groups of lawyers with different probability.  The JFBA 
directory records the backgrounds on all 21,000 active attorneys.  From this list, we first 
entered the information on 1,120 randomly selected lawyers.  Of these attorneys, 23 were 
on the HIT list.  Because the TSR database includes 381 other high-income-taxpayer 
lawyers, we enter the tax and background data for those attorneys as well.  This 
procedure leaves us with a dataset of 1,501 lawyers, of whom 404 paid taxes of over 10 
million yen.  Because of lingering differences reflecting the differing regulatory regime 
under the U.S. occupation before 1972, we exclude Okinawa.  
 Japanese taxpayers pay a tax of 37 percent on ordinary income beyond 18 million 
yen.21  For a crude approximation of income from tax liability, readers thus can simply 
                     
18 Kojin joho no hogo ni kansuru horitsu [Act Relating to the Protection of Personal Information], 
Law No. 57 of 2003. 
19 Tokyo shoko risaachi, ed., Zenkoku kogaku nozeisha meibo [National Registry of High-Income 
Taxpayers] (Tokyo:  Tokyo shoko risaachi, 2004) (CD-ROM version). 
20 Horitsu shimbunsha, ed., Zenkoku bengoshi taikan [National Survey of Lawyers] (Tokyo:  
Horitsu shimbun sha, 2005). 
21 Shotoku zei ho [Income Tax Act], Law No. 33 of 1965, Sec. 89, as amended by Shotokuzeito 
futan keigen sochi ho [Act for Measures to Reduce the Burden of the Income and Other Taxes], Law No. 8 
of 1999.   
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divide the liability by .37.  To illustrate a more nuanced approach, in Table 1 we use 
standard deductions and the full rate schedule to calculate the actual income that would 
generate the taxes given.  By this approach, to owe 10 million yen in taxes, an attorney 
would need to make 39.9 million yen ($390 thousand). 
 
  [Insert Table 1 about here.] 
 
 On Table 2 we detail the tax liabilities of several high-income lawyers.  Highest-
ranking Shin Ushijima paid 227 million yen in taxes, suggesting income of perhaps $6 
million.  Among  Japanese taxpayers in all occupations, he ranked 185th.  Although 
Ushijima advertises himself as an international lawyer, he does not work at one of the 
prominent international firms.  The fact that he never appeared on the High-Income-
Taxpayer list before suggests he received a windfall in 2004, or realized his capital gains 
then.   
 
  [Insert Table 2 about here.] 
 
 From that 227 million, tax liabilities fall quickly.  Fifth-ranked Nobuo Takai paid 
less than half as much, and even he (born in 1937, and nearing the end of his career) had 
made the High-Income-Taxpayer list only four other times.  For some more modestly (if 
still highly) paid lawyers, however, the high incomes come often.  The 20th ranked 
lawyer earned about $1.7 million, and the 50th and 100th ranked (both partners at a major 
international firm) earned $1.1 million to $750 thousand.  Perhaps 58 years old, number 
20 had appeared on the High-Income-Taxpayer list 17 times before.  By age 44, number 
50 had been on it seven times already. 
 
 2.  Limitations. -- As a source of information, tax records inherently present 
several limitations.  Most obviously, taxpayers have an incentive to underreport.  With a 
top marginal bracket of 37 percent, the incentive is strong.  Although the Japanese tax 
and prosecutors’ offices punish cheaters severely, our data will still include some lawyers 
who hide income.   
 Second, the amount of underreporting will increase as firm size falls.  If a lawyer 
in solo practice takes his fee in cash, he need never enter it on his books.  If he practices 
with 50 partners, he will need to keep an accurate set of books in order to split revenue 
and expenses.  If he hopes to cheat the government, he will then have to keep two parallel 
sets of books -- a process that obviously increases the risk that auditors will catch him.22   
 Third, to the extent attorneys have income from other sources, their taxable 
income will overstate their returns from legal practice.  Because the attorneys with the 
highest such returns will accumulate the greatest wealth, over time they will also tend to 
earn the most investment income.  As a result, the fraction of taxable income from legal 
practice should fall both with age and with taxable income.   
 Last, the tax office no longer discloses this information, but even before 2005 
some wealthy Japanese resented its publication (though at least anecdotally some are said 
to have been proud of making the list).  To skirt disclosure, they could do one of two 
                     
22 On one the consequences for this, see [this note + 8], infra. 
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things.  First, they could pay a penalty and submit their return late.  The tax office 
included on its list only those high-income taxpayers who filed within 2 weeks of the 
March 15 return deadline.  By filing after April 1, they could avoid  publication.   
 Second, wealthy attorneys could file an initial return that included only income 
below the amount that triggered disclosure, and then submit an amended return with the 
remaining income.  Because the tax office compiled its list from the initial returns, they  
could  avoid  publication this way too.  We do not know how many taxpayers used either 
strategy.   
 As a check on the reliability of our data,  we compared a lawyer’s 2004 tax 
liability with the average land price of the neighborhood in which he lived.23  To maintain 
comparability, we limited our sample to attorneys in the greater Tokyo area.  The 
correlation coefficient between a lawyer's 2004 tax liability (with 10 million entered for 
those not on the High-Income-Taxpayer list) and the land values in his residential 
neighborhood is 0.19 -- statistically significant at greater than the 0.1 percent level:  
lawyers reporting higher incomes do live in more expensive areas.   
 Parenthetically, note the following:  in Japan, couples may not file joint returns; 
taxpayers with rising incomes may not use "income averaging" across years; gains from 
the sale or exchange of real estate are taxed at 15 percent if held over 5 years and at 30 
percent if held for 5 years or less; and pension payments are taxed at lower rates than 
salaries.  For complex reasons detailed elsewhere, our data exclude most taxes on 
dividends from exchange-listed firms, but do include some (though not all) taxes on 
capital gains from securities transactions.24 
 
 3.  Other sources. -- To our tax data, we add a variety of other information.  We 
take the information on the attorneys themselves from the bar association directory.25  For 
most prefecture-level data on economic welfare we use standard Japanese statistics.26  
We obtain our prefectural information on lawyers and law firms from the bar association.  
“International “firms we define as those that advertise in Martindale-Hubbell, the 
standard American law directory.27  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                     
23 Obtained from the Toyo keizai shimposha, ed., Toshi deeta banku [Metropolitan Data Bank] 
(Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimpo sha, 2005). 
24 See the discussion in Nakzato, Ramseyer, & Rasmusen, supra note xxx.  Both dividends and 
securities capital gains were subject to a national tax of 7 percent. 
25 Horitsu shimbun sha, ed., Zenkoku bengoshi taikan [National Lawyer Directory] (Tokyo:  
Horitsu shimbun sha, 10th ed., 2005).   
26 We should say what these are.xxx 
27 Ken Toba, Nihon jin no heikin chi [Japanese Averages] (Tokyo:  Seikatsu joho sentaa, 2005); 
Nihon bengoshi rengo kai, Bengoshi hakusho [Attorney White Paper] (Tokyo:  Nihon bengoshi rengo kai, 
2005); Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (New York:  Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 2005). 
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C. Variables:  
 
 We define the following variables, and include selected summary statistics in 
Table 3: 
 
 [Insert Table 3 about here.] 
 
1. Tax variables. –  
 
 Ln Tax Liability:  The log of a lawyer’s 2004 (or 2003) tax liability (in 1000 
yen), conditional on appearing on the High-Income-Taxpayer list; the log of  the lower 
cutoff of 10,000   (which equals 10 million yen)  otherwise.   
  Appearances:  The number of times a lawyer has appeared on the High-Income-
Taxpayer list (conditional on appearing in 2004).   
 HIT:  1 if lawyer appeared on the 2004 High-Income-Taxpayer list; 0 otherwise.   
 
2.  Lawyer variables. –  
 
 Flunks:  The estimated number of times a lawyer failed the LRTI entrance exam.  
In general, an attorney first would have taken the exam at age 21.  Accordingly, we 
calculate Flunks using the attorney’s birth year and the year he passed the exam where 
available; where unavailable, we use university and LRTI graduation years.   
 University dummies:  The university from which a lawyer obtained his 
undergraduate degree.  Note that U.Tokyo (university) is a different variable than Tokyo 
(location of practice).  
 Other Tokyo U:  1 if an attorney graduated from a Tokyo-area university other 
than the University of Tokyo, 0 otherwise. 
 Experience:  Years from LRTI graduation to 2004. 
 Sex:  1 if a lawyer is male; 0 if female. 
 International:  1 if a lawyer works at a firm advertised in Martindale-Hubbell; 0 
otherwise. 
 Prefectural dummies:  the prefecture in which an attorney is registered to 
practice 
Prefecture of birth: To instrument attorney location in our instrumental variable 
regressions (Tables 4, 8), we also identify the prefecture in which the lawyer was born; 
where unavailable, we use the lawyer’s registry address (honseki).   
 Metropolitan:  1 if a lawyer is registered to work in one of the prefectures with 
big cities:  Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Hyogo, Aichi, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Hokkaido, or 
Miyagi; 0 otherwise. 
 Tokyo: 1 if a lawyer is registered to work in Tokyo prefecture.  
 Provincial:  1 if a lawyer is registered to work in any prefecture other than 
Tokyo, Osaka, or one of the Metropolitan prefectures; 0 otherwise. 
 
3.  Prefectural variables. – 
  
 Attorneys:  Total number of attorneys, 2004. 
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 New Attorneys:  Total number of new attorneys, 1995-2004.  
 Income PC:  Per capita income, 2001. 
 Bankr'y PC:  Number of judicial declarations of bankruptcy per 1000 population, 
2003. 
 Hospitals PC:  Hospitals per 100,000 population, 2003. 
 Traf Death PC:  Traffic deaths per 100,000 population, 2003 
 Crimes PC:  Criminal Code crimes per 1000 population, 2003. 
 Pro Bono PC:  Number of free consultations with a lawyer, per 1000 population, 
2003. 
 Corp Inc PC:  Corporate income declared to tax office (x 1 billion), per 1000 
population, 2002. 
 New Business %:  New business formation rate, in percentage, 2001. 
 Museums:  Total museums in prefecture (including zoos, acquariums, etc.), 2002. 
 Concerts:  Percent of population (10 years old or older) who attend music 
concerts (excluding classical), 2001.   
 School Internet:  Percent of public schools with high-speed internet access, 2003. 
 College Grads:  Percent of population who graduated from a university, 2000. 
 
 
III.  Talent and Income 
 
A. The Talent Premium: 
 
 The bright lawyers earn more than the dull.  This seemingly obvious point 
emerges clearly even in the summary statistics.  Where our randomly sampled lawyers 
failed the LRTI entrance exam a mean 6.57 times (Flunks), the high-income lawyers 
failed it only 4.97 times.28  Where 74 percent of the randomly sampled lawyers failed it 4 
or more times, only 55 percent of the high-income lawyers did (Table 3 Panels A, B).  
Where only 16 percent of our randomly sampled lawyers attended the perennially first-
ranked University of Tokyo, 31 percent of the high-income lawyers went there (Tab. 3 
Pan. A).   
 Regression results confirm this premium on talent.  In Table 4 Columns (1) and 
(2) (Col. (2) includes prefectural dummies), we regress (through tobit) an attorney's 
logged tax liability on four variables:  Flunks, U Tokyo, Experience, and Sex.  
According to the results, lawyers with University of Tokyo degrees and low Flunks do 
earn more than others.  Note also that men earn more than women, but more experienced 
lawyers do not earn more than their younger competitors.   
 
 [Insert Table 4 about here.] 
                     
28 According to another study, the median successful applicant in 1994 was passing the exam 4 
years after his initial attempt.  18.4 percent were passing it 9 or more years after their initial attempt.  See 
Setsuo Miyazawa, Shiho shiken ni okeru tomen no kadai [Urgent Issues Regarding the LRTI Entrance 
Exam], 481 Hogaku seminaa 76, 77 (1995); see Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note, at 9.  The median 
Flunks among our randomly sampled lawyers is 6.  The difference between that figure and Miyazawa's 
1994 figure probably reflects in part the difference between the 3.3 percent pass rate in 1994 and the sub-2 
percent pass rate during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note, at 7. 
Japanese Bar:  Page 11 
 
 In Table 5, we explore the effect of university backgrounds in more detail.  Again, 
we regress (through tobit) logged tax liabilities on the standard Table 4 variables and a 
dummy variable for each university with more than 7 lawyers in the dataset.  The omitted 
variable is Doshisha University -- the school with the fewest lawyers on the High-
Income-Taxpayer list.  The coefficient on the University of Tokyo again emerges as 
strongly significant.  Traditionally second-ranked University of Kyoto does not fare as 
well, but still outpaces Doshisha, and elite Hokkaido and Kobe universities both earn 
their graduates high incomes.   
 
 [Insert Table 5 about here.] 
 
 
B. The Tokyo Penalty: 
 
 In choosing to work in Tokyo, the average lawyer pays a price.  Tokyo offers the 
widest array of urban amenities in Japan, and for that reason remains a perennial favorite 
among professionals.  Because so many lawyers locate there, however, they apparently 
dissipate the rents.29  Japan may have only 21,000 lawyers, but half (10,300) work in 
Tokyo.  Although Japan has 6,030 people per lawyer, Tokyo has only 1,206.  That puts 
the city of Tokyo behind the nation of  Germany’s 651 citizens per lawyer, but ahead of 
France with its 1,488.30 
 The resulting competition creates a penalty for lawyers with average abilities who 
choose to practice in Tokyo.  Return to the Table 3 summary statistics.  Tokyo lawyers 
are more talented than the provincial lawyers:  25 percent of them attended the University 
of Tokyo compared to 12 percent in the provinces, and they flunked the LRTI exam 6.3 
times compared to 7.5 for the provincial lawyers.  Yet Tokyo lawyers are poorer:  only 
1.8 percent (181) of the 10,263 Tokyo lawyers appeared on the High-Income-Taxpayer 
list compared to 3.4 percent (119) of the 3,460 outside of Tokyo, Osaka, and the 
Metropolitan prefectures (of the randomly sampled lawyers, 1 and 5 percent 
respectively; see Table 3). 
 To explore the Tokyo penalty in more detail, in Column (3) of Table 4 we add 
three geographical variables (Tokyo is the omitted variable).  As with the summary 
statistics, lawyers in the provinces earn higher incomes than those in Tokyo.  Those in the 
second-largest city of Osaka earn less than those in Tokyo, but lawyers in the other 
metropolitan centers earn about as much.   
 Because lawyers will choose where to practice with an eye on their expected 
incomes, location is endogenous. Location affects income, but income affects location 
too.  Accordingly, in Column (5) we use instrumental variables tobit to instrument the 
geographical variables using a lawyer’s hometown. Hometown is a suitable instrument 
because it affects a lawyer’s location choice while not being affected by lawyers’ 
                     
29 The higher incomes need not represent monopoly rents; they could simply reflect the higher 
prices necessary to induce more attorneys to take jobs in areas with fewer of the amenities prized by 
professionals. 
30 Nihon bengoshi, supra note, at 77, 81. 
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incomes at that location. The Tokyo penalty now emerges more clearly still:  Osaka 
lawyers no longer significantly underperform those in Tokyo, and both other 
metropolitan and provincial lawyers earn more than Tokyo lawyers.31 
 
C.  The Differential Premium on Talent: 
 
1.  The talent premium in Tokyo. -- Talented lawyers choose Tokyo despite the general 
penalty because the complex practice places a premium on their abilities.  In Columns (4) 
and (6) of Table 4, we interact Flunks and U Tokyo with Tokyo as the place of practice.  
Both interacted variables now emerge as strongly significant, which means that  a low 
Flunk score matters more for high incomes in Tokyo than elsewhere, as does a 
University of Tokyo degree.  Attorneys who attend an elite university and pass the bar-
exam equivalent on their first or second try not only earn more regardless of where they 
practice, but also can earn an additional return on their talent in Tokyo that they would 
not find elsewhere. 
 
 2.  The international firms. -- Many of the talented lawyers earn this return by 
affiliating themselves with one of the large international firms in Tokyo.  Those who 
choose these firms (and who are hired by them) are indeed able.  Where University of 
Tokyo graduates constitute  16 percent of our random sample and 25 percent of our 
Tokyo random sample, they are 57 percent of the randomly sampled international firms.  
Where the randomly sampled lawyers flunked the LRTI exam 6.57 times, the randomly 
sampled international lawyers flunked it only 4.31 times.   
 At the international firms, these talented lawyers earn high incomes.  The 
international lawyers constitute 5 percent of the random sample, but 22 percent of the 
High-Income-Taxpayer list.  They are 11 percent of the Tokyo random sample, but 49 
percent of the Tokyo High-Income-Taxpayer list.  The decision to work at such a firm is 
obviously endogenous to expected income, but were we to include International in our 
Column (1) Table 4 regression (a regression we ran but do not include in the table), the 
coefficient would be positive and significant at more than the 0.1 percent level. 
 Over the past several decades, the international firms grew steadily (and 
exponentially), and as they did the tendency for talented lawyers to join them increased 
as well.  Among all randomly sampled University of Tokyo graduates who passed the 
LRTI exam on one of their first 4 tries, 23 percent work at one of the Tokyo international 
firms.  Among those with 20 years or less experience, 54 percent work there.  But among 
those who joined the bar in the last decade, 63 percent do.  Of the most talented young 
lawyers, in short, nearly two-thirds join an international firm. 
 
D.  The Dynamics of Locational Choice: 
 
 1.  Elite and non-elite lawyers. -- Because of the differential returns to talent in 
Tokyo and the provinces, the brightest young lawyers opt for careers in the capital, while 
                     
31 The differential patterns to tax evasion suggest that this Tokyo penalty may be even larger than 
we observe.  The rich Tokyo lawyers work at large firms, where systematic tax evasion is hard.  The rich 
provincial lawyers mostly work in one-lawyer firms where cash receipts need never be entered on the 
books.   
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many of the slower lawyers avoid it.  To explore this phenomenon, we first partition 
lawyers by the opportunity costs they face.  Consider Figure 1, a plot of the percentage of 
lawyers from different schools against the number of times they failed the LRTI exam.  
University of Tokyo students receive the best job offers, and disproportionately they pass 
the exam on one of their first four tries.   
 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
 
 The reason that most Tokyo graduates   pass in four times or less is not that  the 
average Tokyo graduate   who hopes for a legal career passes quickly.  Even Tokyo 
graduates pass at only an 8.2 percent rate.32  If they kept on trying, we would expect half 
of them to pass only after about 8 years of trying (8.2 of 100 the first year, .082(100-8.2) 
the second year, 082 (100- .082(100-8.2)) the third year, and so forth).   Rather, the 
typical Tokyo graduate lawyer passes in four years because  his classmates who fail four 
times  jettison the effort and take well-paying corporate jobs.  It is worth noting that   a 
student can   take the test four times    still retain access to the university placement 
machinery if he takes it  once (or perhaps twice) during his first four years in college, a 
second time by delaying graduation a year, and a third or fourth time by enrolling in a 
master's program.   
 Beyond those four years, students increasingly find it hard to obtain job offers 
from corporate employers.  Accordingly, those with job prospects at the best firms tend to 
drop out of the LRTI exam pool after four years.  Disproportionately , those who do 
poorly on the job market anyway continue to take the exam.  They obviously face lower 
odds of ever passing, but while continuing their studies they make do as best they can by 
living at home or taking assorted odd jobs.  They are not unlike those American students 
who fail to get a good job after college and tell people they are “planning to go to law 
school”.  
 Hence the reason so many people try so hard to become lawyers despite the 
income:  for many of them, the modestly high income is not modest.  Instead, it  exceeds 
what they could earn elsewhere.  The bulk of the people taking the exam are not the 
University of Tokyo elite who choose between the bar and a position at NEC.  Elite 
students attack the exam 3 or 4 times and if unsuccessful take the NEC job.  Instead, most 
of the people taking the exam are men and women without access to such high-paying 
jobs.  For them, a job as an attorney offers very good prospects indeed. 
 
 2.  The locational choice. -- Table 6   presents the locational choice that lawyers 
with differing abilities face.  We define an "elite" lawyer as a University of Tokyo 
graduate who passes the LRTI exam on one of his first four tries (Flunks < 3).  
According to Column (1), elite lawyers earn significantly higher incomes in Tokyo (often 
at one of the international firms) than elsewhere.  According to Column (2), everyone 
else earns more if they stay out of the city.   
 
 [Insert Table 6 about here.] 
 
                     
32 Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note, at 8. 
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 In Table 6 Column (3), we regress (through probit) the locational choice each 
lawyer makes (Tokyo = 1) on his background.  Those with low Flunk scores and 
withUniversity of Tokyo degrees opt for Tokyo careers.  Although graduates of other 
Tokyo schools also tend to stay in Tokyo, the lower marginal effect suggests they less 
often stay than those from the University of Tokyo.  Among University of Tokyo 
graduates, 72 percent choose to work in the city.  Among those from other Tokyo 
universities, only 62 percent do.  And among those from all other universities, only 42 
percent do.   
 The resulting lesson is straightforward.  The most talented lawyers earn more in 
Tokyo than the provinces, and tend to opt for Tokyo jobs.  The less talented earn more in 
the provinces, and tend to opt for provincial jobs. 
 Note,  however, that we need not feel sorry for the less talented lawyers who stay 
in Tokyo and earn less. They do, after all, get to live in Tokyo.  If they had the 
opportunity to earn a high income in Kumamoto and decided to have a low income in 
Tokyo, then we can conclude they think living in Tokyo is worth the lower income.  
Thus, part of the scarcity rent for lawyers in Japan may show up as the job amenity of a 
good location instead of as high income.  
  
E.  The Determinants of Provincial Income: 
 Among the half of all lawyers who choose not to work in Tokyo, who succeeds?  
To explore the question, in Table 7 we regress an attorney’s logged tax liability on his 
personal variables and a series of characteristics about the prefecture.  We take as our 
dataset all lawyers not in Tokyo.  Consistently, those who failed the LRTI exam fewer 
times do earn more than those who failed it more often.  The University of Tokyo degree, 
however, earns a lawyer no advantage.  As in prior regressions, more experienced 
lawyers do not earn more than younger lawyers, and men make more than women. 
 
 [Insert Table 7 about here.] 
 
 Because prices depend on competition, we include in Table 7 the number of 
attorneys per prefecture.  To be sure, most provincial attorneys do simply work where 
they were born.  Among our randomly sampled lawyers outside of Tokyo, Osaka, and the 
Metropolitan areas, 79 percent work where they were born.  Yet only 64 percent of 
those Metropolitan lawyers were born where they work, and only 37 percent of the 
Osaka lawyers and only 38 percent of the Tokyo lawyers were born there.  A LRTI 
graduate from rural Miyazaki will not open a practice in rural Niigata, apparently, but he 
may well decide to stay in Tokyo.  [xxx this should be attorneys per capita or some such 
measure] 
 When deciding whether to stay in the city or to return home, a rural-born young 
lawyer will choose in part on the basis of the income he can expect to earn in the two 
areas.  To eliminate this endogeneity in Table 7, we instrument the number of attorneys 
in each prefecture with proxies for the level of amenities available there:  Museums, 
Concerts, School Internet, and College Grads.  As one would expect, so instrumented 
an increase in the number of attorneys generally lowers attorney incomes (Cols. (1), (3); 
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though not in all specifications).  The number of new attorneys (Col. (2)) seems to have 
much the same effect.33   
 Turn to the other prefecture-specific variables.  We try a variety of these. The 
standard method is to put them all in one regression, to find out which of several collinear 
variables is really explaining the dependent variable, income.  We do that in column (7), 
and the method works if enough observations are available, but in small samples it is not 
so dependable, so we also run several regressions that focus on a single prefecture-
specific variable, a procedure useful especially for determining what is not causal.   First, 
higher general per capita incomes lead to higher attorney incomes (Col. (3)).  People in 
richer prefectures apparently buy legal services poorer people do without.  Second, 
bankruptcies are positively associated with attorney incomes (Col. (3)).  When a firm 
fails it and its creditors take a variety of strategies that may rely on an attorney's services 
(the correlation between bankruptcies per capita and litigation per capita is .94).  Per 
capita income held constant, attorneys in prefectures with more bankruptcies earn higher 
incomes. 
 Third, hospitals and perhaps serious traffic accidents are also associated positively 
with attorney incomes (Col. (4)).  Given the dearth of malpractice claims,34 the 
coefficient on hospitals would not directly reflect disputes over the medical care itself.  
Instead, perhaps it captures the claims arising out of the injuries that brought the patients 
to the hospital in the first place (though the correlation between traffic deaths per capita 
and hospitals per capita is modestly negative).  Fourth, serious crimes are not associated 
with high attorney incomes in Japan (Col. (5)).  Criminal defense work rarely makes 
lawyers rich in the U.S., and it seems not to do so in Japan. 
 Fifth, higher levels of pro bono services are associated with lower attorney 
incomes (Col. (5)).  Hypothetically, the amount of the pro bono work could reflect either 
(i) general prefectural income levels (attorneys offer free services most readily to poor 
people) or (ii) the amount of unbilled time attorneys have (attorneys provide pro bono 
work when short of billable projects; this would make the variable endogenous, of 
course).  In fact, it reflects (ii):  if we regress Pro Bono PC on Income PC and Ln Tax 
Liabilities, we obtain coefficients and t-statistics of .0008 (2.87) and -1.193 (3.46).35  
Attorneys do not offer pro bono services when they live in poorer communities.  They 
offer them when they need to advertise their services and generate demand.   
 Last, higher general levels of business activity are not associated with higher 
attorney incomes (Col. (6)).  Although business activity entails transactional work, 
apparently moderate-sized regional firms tend not to hire lawyers for such work.  Instead, 
only the exchange-listed Tokyo firms do, and they hire their lawyers on the Tokyo 
market.   
 In Column (7), we include all these prefecture-specific variables.  Only the 
Bankruptcy PC and Pro Bono PC are strongly significant. 
 
                     
33 On prefecture-level changes in the number of attorneys, see Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note, at 
38-39. 
34 See, e.g., Robert B. Leflar & Futoshi Iwata, Medical Error as Reportable Event, as Tort, as 
Crime:  A Transpacific Comparison (Jan. 22, 2006; unpublished). 
35 We use OLS with robust standard errors.  We include all attorneys outside Tokyo; n = 802. 
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F.  Robustness Checks: 
 We close by exploring whether our principal findings are robust to alternative 
specifications.  Toward that end, in Panel A of Table 8 we experiment with other 
regression techniques.  The three alternatives of OLS, probit, and Poisson regression all 
come to much the same result as tobit.   In all four regressions the coefficients on Flunks 
are significantly negative, and those on U Tokyo significantly positive.  Whether we use 
the tobit regressions discussed earlier (Column (1)), whether we limit ourselves to 
taxpayers on the High-Income-Taxpayer list (Column (2)), whether we use as our 
dependent variable a High-Income-Taxpayer-list dummy (Column (3)), or whether we 
use as that dependent variable the number of times a lawyer appeared on the High-
Income-Taxpayer list (Column (4)) -- regardless of the specification we use, we obtain 
consistent results. 
 In Panel B, we repeat our principal regressions on logged 2003 tax liability.  
Because we have 2003 tax data only on those lawyers who also appeared on the 2004 list, 
the exercise is obviously imperfect.  Again, however, we obtain results consistent with 
the ones in our main regressions.  In our basic Column (1) regression, the marginal 
effects on Flunks and U Tokyo are significant in the predicted directions.  In Columns 
(2) and (4), the regressions indicate that lawyers in the provinces and lesser cities report 
higher incomes than attorneys in Tokyo.  And in Columns (3) and (5), they indicate that 
the University of Tokyo graduates and low-Flunk attorneys earn the largest premium in 
Tokyo (though the Flunk-Tokyo interaction  is not significant in the instrumental 
variables regression). 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 The Japanese legal services industry presents a bifurcated market.  As the locus 
for complex transactions and litigation, Tokyo attracts the most talented lawyers.  
Disproportionately, they choose to practice there, and earn incomes commensurate with 
their ability.  Because Tokyo attracts so many lawyers, however, those who work there 
earn lower scarcity rents than they would earn in the provinces.   
 With far fewer lawyers, the provinces do offer monopoly rents.  
Disproportionately, many of the less talented lawyers opt for careers there.  Facing lower 
opportunity costs to a legal career, they willingly spend many years studying to pass the 
bar-exam equivalent.  Once they pass, they return to their home prefecture, and earn what 
are -- for them -- handsome returns.   
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Table 1:  Calculating Income from Tax Liability 
 
 
 
  The amount of income that would generate a tax liability of 10 million 
yen is about 39.9 million yen.  To reach this conclusion, we make the 
following calculations: 
 
A.  The Principles: 
 
  1.  Assume the taxpayer has only salary income.  If so, he will have 
the standard salary income deduction of 5 percent plus 1,700,000 yen.  See 
Shotoku zei ho [Income Tax Act], Law No. 33 of 1965, Sec. 28. 
 
  2.  Assume further that this taxpayer has no children, no life 
insurance, no charitable donations, no medical expenses, etc..  If so, he 
will have only the three basic personal deductions:  his own deduction, his 
spouse' deduction, and a social security deduction.  Assume the last equals 
1 million yen (in fact, it varies by salary level).  See Shotoku zei ho, 
Secs. 74, 83, 86.   
 
  * Basic personal deduction      380,000 yen 
  * Sousal deduction      380,000 
  * Social security deduction   1,000,000  
 
  3.  A taxpayer with an income in this range will face the full maximum 
marginal rate:  37 percent.  The actual amount of the tax is given as 37 
percent of his income, less a deduction of 2.49 million yen.   
 
  4.  This taxpayer will also have the currently standard lump-sum tax 
credit of 250,000 yen.  Shotokuzei to futan keigen sochi ho [Act to Reduce 
the Burden of the Income Tax], Law. 8 of 1999, Sec. 6. 
 
B.  Tax calculation: 
 
 Gross income:      39,900,000 
 
 Salary income:  
    39,900,000 x .95 - 1,700,000 =    36,205,000 
 
 Taxable income: 
    36,205,000 
       380,000 
       380,000 
   - 1,000,000 
    34,445,000      34,445,000  
  
 Income Tax: 
    34,445,000 x .37 - 2,490,000 =    10,254,650 
 
 Less lump-sum tax credit: 
    10,254,650 - 250,000 =     10,004,650 
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Table 2:  Selected High-Income Lawyers 
 
 
   Rank   .          Bar       2004    No. 
(att)*(all)**   Name    Firm Pref. YOB pass University Taxes Appear. 
 
  1    185 Shin Ushijima Ushijima sogo Tokyo 1949 1974 U Tokyo 227,161  1 
  5    770 Nobuo Takai Takai law Tokyo 1937 1960 U Tokyo 106,749  5 
 10  1,315 Mutuo Tahara Habataki Osaka 1943 1966 Kyoto U  80,344 12 
 20  2,061 Yuichi Suzuki Tokyo keizai Tokyo 1946 1972 Keio U  64,171 18 
 50  4,566 Shin Kikuchi Mori Hamada Tokyo 1960 1981 U Tokyo  43,013  7 
100 10,449 T. Shinagawa Mori Hamada Tokyo 1958 1982 U Tokyo  28,653  1 
200 30,273 Sentaro Arai Arai law Tokyo 1938 1961 Meiji U  16,966  9 
 
 
Notes:  * Rank among attorneys.  ** Rank among all taxpayers.  Taxes are in x1000 yen. "No. 
Appear." gives the number of times the lawyer has appeared on the High-Income-Taxpayer list. 
 
Sources:  Horitsu shimbunsha, ed., Zenkoku bengoshi taikan [National Survey 
of Lawyers] (Tokyo:  Horitsu shimbun sha, 2005); Tokyo shoko risaachi, ed., 
Zenkoku kogaku nozeisha meibo [National Registry of High-Income Taxpayers] 
(Tokyo:  Tokyo shoko risaachi, 2004) (CD-ROM version). 
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Table 3:  Summary Statistics for Attorney Characteristics 
 
A.  Introduction: 
     Random Sample    .     High-Income-Taxpayer       
 n min median mean max n min  median mean max   . 
 
High-Income-Taxpayer  1120    .02 
Tax Liability      404 10,010 16,872 24,756 227,161 
Flunks  904 0 6 6.57 20 377    0     4   4.97      18 
U Tokyo 1120 0   .16  1 404    0     .31  1 
 
Tokyo location 1120 0   .47  1 404    0     .45  1 
Osaka location 1120 0   .13  1 404    0     .03  1 
Other Metropolitan 1120 0   .24  1 404    0     .23  1 
Provinces 1120 0   .16  1 404    0     .29  1 
 
B.  Income Levels and Lawyer Characteristics: 
    Random High Income    
 
Mean Flunks   6.57  4.97     
% Flunks > 3   74.2  55.2     
% International   5.7  22.3     
% U Tokyo   15.9  31.4     
% Chuo U   19.3  17.8     
% Tokyo   46.7  44.8     
 
n      404   1120 
 
C.  Geography and Lawyer Characteristics: 
 
1.  Random Sample 
        Other 
    Tokyo  Osaka  Metro  Provinc’l 
 
% U Tokyo   24.7   5.4   7.1  12.3 
% Chuo U   24.9   6.0  16.0  19.0 
% High Income   1.0  <0.1   3.3   5.0 
Mean Flunks   6.32  6.31  6.65  7.50 
% Flunks > 3  70.5  69.8  77.7  85.6 
n     523   149   184   179 
 
2.  High Income Taxpayers 
 
% U Tokyo   59.7     0   5.4  11.8 
% Chuo U   12.7     0  20.4  25.2 
Mean Flunks   3.38  4.00  6.20  6.79 
% Flunks > 3  37.6  54.5  72.8  71.0 
n     181    11    93   107 
 
 
Notes:  Panels B and C give the relevant figure for the population of lawyers 
in each column.  In Panel B, among the high-income lawyers, the mean Flunks 
score was 4.97. In Panel C, among the randomly sampled Tokyo lawyers, 24.7 
percent came from the University of Tokyo.   
Sources:  See Table 2. 
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Table 4:  Determinants of Attorney Income 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) . 
 
      IV  IV 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit 
 
Flunks -.019 -.020 -.020 -.009 -.078 -.030 
 (5.67) (6.05) (6.00) (1.81) (7.12) (0.89) 
 
U Tokyo  .194  .204  .187 -.057  .601 -.197 
 (5.30) (5.64) (5.33) (0.93) (5.78) (0.98) 
 
Experience  .000 -.000  .000  .001 -.002  .001 
 (0.09) (0.31) (0.02) (0.45) (0.54) (0.45) 
 
Male  .125  .099  .105  .191  .487  .573 
 (5.32) (4.07) (4.22) (4.03) (2.71) (3.22) 
 
Osaka   -.122  -.457 
   (4.57)  (1.34) 
Metropolitan    .042   .399 
   (1.36)  (2.60) 
Provinces    .122   .543 
   (3.45)  (4.06) 
 
Tokyo * Flunks    -.047  -.093 
    (3.33)  (1.44) 
Tokyo * U Tokyo     .514   .985 
    (3.63)  (2.79) 
Tokyo     .110   .136 
    (1.81)  (0.22) 
 
Prefectural dummies No Yes No No No No   
 
n 1261 1261 1261 1261 1235 1235 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is Ln Tax Liability. For data sources, see 
Table 2.   
 Columns (1) through (4) are tobit.  For continuous variables, the 
number reported is the marginal effect of the independent variable, 
calculated at the median; for dummy variables, it is the marginal effect of a 
discrete change from 0 to 1.   z statistic are in parentheses.   
 Columns (5) and (6) are instrumental variable tobit with Newey’s two-
step estimator.  In Column (5) we instrument the regional variables with the 
hometown of the lawyer, and in Column (6) we do the same for Tokyo.  These iv 
tobit regressions give the regression coefficients themselves (not the 
marginal effects.   
 In Columns (2), (3) and (5), the omitted prefecture is Tokyo.  
Prefectural results are calculated in Column (3) but not reported. 
 In all cases, a constant term is calculated but not reported.   
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Table 5:  The Effect of University Background 
 
          Random Sample        .    All         .  Regression Results     . 
 
 Total Tokyo HIT     Mean     HIT       A   B  C 
   n   n  n     Flunks  n Coeff. S.E.   Marg. Eff. 
 
Public, Tokyo 
U Tokyo 178 129 7 5.25 127 1.584** (.553) .322*** 
Hitotsub’i  27  16 1 6.15  10 1.024* (.590) .131** 
 
Public, Other 
U Kyoto  76  10 2 5.24 23  .876 (.562) .098** 
Tohoku U  25  11 0 6.67  9  .917 (.595) .107* 
Kansai U  25   0 1 8.75  4  .727 (.623) .071 
Osaka U  17   1 0 5.59  5  .943 (.615) .112 
Osaka City   12   0 0 8.17  2  .811 (.677) .085 
Hokkaido U  11   2 1 7.09  9 1.471** (.610) .274** 
Nagoya U  11   3 1 7.54  5 1.166* (.638) .169* 
Kyushu U  10   2 0 6.67  4 1.160* (.652) .168 
Kobe U   7   0 1 7.71  7 1.614** (.633) .335* 
 
Private, Tokyo 
Chuo U 216 130 4 7.00 72  .990* (.553) .123*** 
Waseda U 105  60 1 7.14 39 1.195** (.558) .178*** 
Keio U  51  40 0 6.04 18 1.092* (.570) .149*** 
Meiji U  39  24 0 6.29  7  .608 (.593) .053 
Nihon U  21  16 0 9.10  8 1.144* (.606) .163** 
 
Private, Other 
Doshisha U  14   4 0 6.07  1  
Ritsumeikan   7   0 0 6.43  3 1.085 (.681) .147 
 
Other Univ  74  35 2 7.69 22  .969* (.566) .118** 
 
No Univ 195  41 2 7.78 29 1.130* (.656) .159 
 
 
Notes:  In other words, there were 178 University of Tokyo graduates in 
the random sample, and 129 of those 178 worked in Tokyo.  Seven of the 
178 were on the High-Income-Taxpayer list, and on that High-Income-
Taxpayer there were 120 not in our random sample, making a total of 127 
U Tokyo graduates.  The 178 random-sample U Tokyo graduates had a mean 
Flunks score of 5.25.   
 The last three columns give the results of a tobit regression of 
Ln Tax Liability on dummy variables for each of the universities, 
Tokyo, Flunks, Experience, and a constant term.  As the omitted term, 
we take the university with the fewest graduates on the HIT list:  
Doshisha U.  Col. A. gives the coefficient, Col. B gives the standard 
errors, and Col. C. gives the marginal effect of a discrete change from 
0 to 1, which here is a semi-elasticity:  the % change in an attorney's 
tax liability as result of that discrete change.   
 Stars indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
levels.  Sources:  See Table 2.  [xxx Actually, Chuo would be a better 
omitted dummy than Doshisha. I think Doshisha is significantly 
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different from all the others—hence the significant marginal effects--- 
but none of te others are different from each other.] 
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Figure 1:  Dropping Out of the Lawyer Market 
 
  Notes:  In the figure, we give the percentage of lawyers with a 
given Flunks score for the University of Tokyo, Chuo University, and 
all other universities. [The first horizontal point is 0 not 1.] 
 Sources:  See Table 2. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - -  
Table 6:  A Lawyer’s Choice of Where to Practice 
   
 (1) 
 
Elite College 
 
(2) 
 
Non-Elite 
College 
 
(3) 
 
All Colleges 
Dependent variable:  Ln Tax Ln Tax Tokyo location
    
 Tobit 
 
 
Tobit Probit 
    
    
Experience -.008 (1.85) .003 (4.36)  
Tokyo .412 (3.62) -.037 (2.20)  
Flunks   -.008 (2.72) 
 
U Tokyo   .547 (16.32) 
Other Tokyo Univ   .350 (11.71) 
    
n 167 1267 1261 
 
   Notes:  For the continuous variables, the regressions give the 
marginal effect of the independent variable, calculated at the median; 
for dummy variables, they give the marginal effect of a discrete change 
from 0 to 1.  The corresponding z-statistic follows in parentheses.  
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All regressions include a constant term.  Elite is as defined in text. 
In regression (3), the omitted dummy is “Non-Tokyo University”. 
 Sources:  See Table 2. 
 
 
 Table 7:  Determinants of Attorney Income outside Tokyo 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) . 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Flunks -.025 -.025 -.026 -.022 -.023 -.024 -.025 
 (2.73) (2.75) (2.81) (2.41) (2.43) (2.65) (2.68) 
 
U Tokyo -.193 -.192 -.161 -.179 -.203 -.178 -.183 
 (1.61) (1.59) (1.33) (1.51) (1.66) (1.50) (1.52) 
 
Experience -.001 -.001 -.002  .001  .000 -.001  .000 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.45) (0.20) (0.00) (0.16) (0.12) 
 
Sex   .810  .806  .814  .900  .938  .838  .988 
 (2.32) (2.30) (2.26) (2.56) (2.65) (2.33) (2.70) 
 
Attorneys -.0002  -.0005 -.000  .0004 -.0003  .000 
 (5.56)  (5.44) (0.84) (2.07) (3.11) (1.40) 
 
New Attys  -.001 
  (5.56) 
Income PC   .001    -.000 
    (3.24)    (0.22) 
Bankr'y PC    .455     .298 
   (3.90)    (2.98) 
Hospitals PC     .030    .005 
    (2.11)   (0.26) 
Traf Death PC     .059    .025 
    (1.47)   (0.71) 
Crimes PC     -.040  -.003 
     (2.94)  (0.28) 
Pro Bono PC     -.154  -.150 
     (3.48)  (3.48) 
Corp Inc PC      -.001  .001 
      (1.20) (0.81) 
New Business %       .015 -.265 
      (0.17) (1.88) 
 
 Notes:  n = 621. The dependent variable is Ln Tax Liability. We 
use only those lawyers located outside of Tokyo.  For data sources, see 
Table 2. PC = per capita. 
   The regressions are instrumental variable tobit with Newey’s 
two-step estimator.  In these estimations, we instrument Attorneys (or 
New Attys) with variables proxying for the amenities available in the 
prefecture:  Museums, Concerts, School Internet, and College Grads.  
These regressions give the regression coefficients themselves (not the 
marginal effects), followed by the absolute value of the t statistic on 
the line below.  In all cases, a constant term is calculated but not 
reported.   
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Table 8:  Determinants of Attorney Income: 
Robustness Checks 
 
 
A.  Alternative Regression Forms: 
 
  (1) (2)*  (3)   (4) 
 Tobit OLS Probit Poisson    . 
 
Flunks -.065 (6.40) -.034 (4.22) -.053 (5.23) .014 (2.26) 
U Tokyo  .511 (5.93)  .317 (4.70)  .376 (4.16) .282 (6.04) 
Experience  .000 (0.09) -.002 (0.68)  .001 (0.36) .039 (20.59) 
Sex  .637 (3.68) -.173 (1.06)  .730 (4.12) .477 (2.98) 
 
n 1261 377 1261 377 
Dep. Var.: Ln Tax Ln Tax HIT Num.  
 Liability Liability  Appearances. 
 
Notes:  * Those attorneys who paid at least 10 million yen in 2004 
taxes only.  The table gives the regression coefficient (for Column 
(1), not the marginal effects as in other tables), followed by the 
absolute value of the corresponding t- (or z-) statistic in 
parentheses.  All regressions include a constant term. The OLS 
regression’s R2 is xxx.  
 
 
B.  Using 2003 Tax Liability: 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit 
 
Flunks -.015 (4.90) -.015 (5.14) -.009 (2.22) -.082 (6.21) -.028 (0.71) 
U Tokyo  .135 (4.17)  .134 (4.45) -.023 (0.43)  .590 (4.87) -.098 (0.42) 
Experience  .001 (1.44)  .001 (1.12)  .002 (1.45)  .003 (0.71)  .006 (1.56) 
Sex  .114 (6.44)  .091 (5.02)  .163 (3.97)  .735 (3.11)  .846 (3.53) 
 
Osaka  -.063 (2.71)  -.252 (0.67)  
Metropolitan   .057 (2.01)   .495 (2.79) 
Provinces   .104 (3.27)   .574 (3.69) 
 
Tokyo * Flunks   -.033 (2.56)  -.112 (1.43) 
Tokyo * U Tokyo    .348 (2.75)   .812 (1.93) 
Tokyo    .048 (0.90)   .222 (0.30) 
 
n 1261 1261 1261 1235 1235 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is Ln Tax Liability for the 2003 tax 
year (x 1000) if an attorney was on the 2004 HIT list; logged 10,000 
otherwise.   
 Columns (1) through (3) are tobit.  For continuous variables, 
these tobit regressions give the marginal effect of the independent 
variable, calculated at the median; for dummy variables, they give the 
marginal effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1.  After the marginal 
effect, the table gives the absolute value of the corresponding z 
statistic.   
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 Columns (4) and (5) are instrumental variable tobit with Newey’s 
two-step estimator.  In the iv tobit estimations, we instrument the 
regional variables with the hometown of the lawyer.  These iv tobit 
regressions give the regression coefficients themselves (not the 
marginal effects).   
 In all cases, a constant term is calculated but not reported.   
 
 Sources:  See Table 2. 
 
 
